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ABSTRACT 
This study presents evidence about relations between national culture and 
social institutions. We operationalize culture with data on cultural dimensions for over 
50 nations adopted from cross-cultural psychology and generate testable hypotheses 
about three basic social norms of governance: the rule of law, corruption, and 
accountability. These norms correlate systematically and strongly with national scores 
on cultural dimensions and also differ across cultural regions of the world. 
Regressions indicate that quantitative measures of national culture are alone 
remarkably predictive of governance, that economic inequality and British heritage 
add to predictive power, but that economic development and other factors add little. 
The results suggest a framework for understanding the relations between fundamental 
institutions of social order as well as policy implications for reform programs in 
transition economies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Culturally diverse views on the rule of law as a desirable mode of governance 
date from antiquity. Socrates and Confucius expounded the classic and diametrical 
positions. The scholastic debate over the optimal mechanisms of social order has not 
subsided since. Collectively referred to as “social institutions” (or simply 
“institutions”), the rule of law, together with accountability and curbing corruption, 
are considered primary mediators for development.
1 These principles are the central 
tenets in international institutions’ policies on  “good governance” and 
“empowerment” (IMF 1997, World Bank 2000, 2001). International bodies are 
careful to acknowledge that reform programs need to be attentive to national cultures 
yet fail to specify ways to achieve this goal. 
This study seeks to identify the foundations of these social institutions, in 
particular, their roots in national culture. We view the rule of law, curbing corruption, 
and accountability as part of a general category of social norms referred to as “norms 
of governance.” Social norms of governance prescribe desirable modes of wielding 
political, economic, or other forms of power. We postulate that the potency of such 
norms depends upon the prevailing, shared cultural value orientations in a society. We 
hypothesize that in societies whose prevailing culture emphasizes the moral equality 
of individuals and legitimizes individuals’ pursuit of their own preferences, we will 
find greater compliance with formal legal rules, exercise of discretionary power 
undistorted by bribes, and feedback mechanisms of accountability. Societies 
characterized by such a culture provide a more transparent normative environment 
                                                 
1 The literature on this subject is burgeoning. For sample works, see Kufamnn, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobatón (1999); Knack and Keefer (1995); La Porta et al. (1997a); Hall and Jones (1999); Mauro 
(1995; 1997). For a review, Easterly and Levine (2002).  
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and enable individuals better to plan their moves. But can we measure culture 
reliably? 
To test this broad hypothesis, this study advances a new framework for the 
discourse of culture and social institutions. We adopt established theories and 
empirical data from cross-cultural psychology to operationalize the cultural profiles of 
nations. We examine whether profiles of nations on cultural dimensions can predict 
perceived national differences in adherence to governance norms. Consistent with our 
theorizing, we find that they do. Emphases on individual autonomy and egalitarianism 
in national cultures correlate positively with better governance. Combining these 
cultural variables with variables for economic inequality and a history of British rule 
yields a parsimonious model remarkably predictive of governance and robust to 
various controls. 
Results of this study enrich our understanding of links between social 
institutions and culture. They show how particular types of governance institutions are 
intimately related to general cultural characteristics of nations. Crucially, the evidence 
for such links is based on rigorous empirical analysis across many nations rather than 
on anecdotal speculations about culture and governance in specific nations. We will 
address the issue of causal relations among the various factors considered, though we 
cannot fully resolve it because these factors interact with one another to engender 
large-scale social equilibria. We argue, however, that for better understanding the 
dynamics of social institutions and for informing policy-making it is crucial to 
identify factors that may be more or less susceptible to change. Cultural orientations 
are relatively stable. They can therefore impede reform and induce path-dependence 
in social change. This has implications for development and reform programs, some 
of which we discuss.  
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II.  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A.  Values and Dimensions of Culture
2 
Definitions of culture abound. In order to distinguish culture from structural 
aspects of society that might influence governance, we define culture in subjective 
terms. Culture refers to the complex of meanings, symbols, and assumptions about 
what is good or bad, legitimate or illegitimate that underlie the prevailing practices 
and norms in a society (Bourdieu 1972; Markus and Kitayama 1994). Value emphases 
are the essence of culture seen this way. They are the implicitly or explicitly shared, 
abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society (Williams 1970). 
They justify and guide the ways that social institutions (e.g., the family, education, 
economic, political, religious systems) function, their goals and modes of operation. 
Social actors (e.g., organizational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) draw on 
these cultural value emphases to select actions, evaluate people and events, and 
explain or justify their actions and evaluations (Kluckhohn 1951).  
Many different value emphases could be chosen to characterize cultures. 
Rather than using arbitrary intuitions to select values relevant to governance, we 
utilize the key dimensions of culture identified in the theoretical and empirical 
literature of cross-cultural psychology, the discipline that specializes in cross-national 
comparisons of culture. A common postulate in cross-cultural psychology is that all 
societies confront similar basic issues or problems when they come to regulate human 
activity (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961). The key dimensions of culture are derived 
from these issues, because the preferred ways of dealing with them are expressed in 
                                                 
2 This part begins with a somewhat lengthy discussion of theories of cultural orientations and their 
empirical expression in value emphases, on the assumption that readers may not be familiar with them.  
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different societal value emphases. It is thus possible to characterize the culture 
of different societies by measuring the prevailing value emphases on these key 
dimensions. This yields unique cultural profiles. 
Schwartz (1994; 1999) has provided the set of cultural value dimensions we 
mainly use in this study. He derived three bipolar, cultural value dimensions from three 
basic issues that confront all societies. In coping with these issues, societies exhibit 
greater or lesser emphasis on the values at one or the other pole of each dimension. 
Analysis of the bipolar dimensions yields seven value orientations on which cultures can 
be compared. The theory also specifies how these orientations relate to one another. We 
briefly describe these three value dimensions, the seven orientations, and the basic issues 
with which they deal. Figure 1 presents graphically the relations among the value 
dimensions and orientations. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Embeddedness/Autonomy: This dimension concerns the desirable relationship 
between the individual and the group. Embeddedness refers to a cultural emphasis on 
the person as embedded in the group and committed to maintaining the status quo, 
propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or 
the traditional order. The opposite pole of Autonomy describes cultures in which the 
person is viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her 
own uniqueness. It is possible to distinguish conceptually between two types of 
Autonomy. Intellectual Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of 
individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions. 
Affective Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals 
independently pursuing affectively positive experience.  
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Hierarchy/Egalitarianism: This dimension concerns the desirable 
ways to guarantee responsible behavior that preserves the social fabric. Hierarchy 
refers to a cultural emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal 
distribution of power, roles, and resources. Egalitarianism refers to an emphasis on 
transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the 
welfare of others whom one sees as moral equals. 
Mastery/Harmony: This dimension concerns the relation of humankind to the 
natural and social world. Mastery refers to a cultural emphasis on getting ahead 
through active self-assertion in order to master, change, and exploit the natural and 
social environment. Harmony refers to an emphasis on accepting the social and 
physical world as it is, trying to comprehend and fit in rather than to change or exploit 
it. 
Hofstede (1980; 2001) advances another pioneering dimensional framework 
for characterizing cultures to which we make certain references below. This theory 
and the findings based on it dominate current international management studies. Next, 
we set forth the Hofstede dimensions and the basic societal problems they address.  
Individualism/Collectivism: This dimension refers to the relationship between 
individual and group. An individualist orientation values loosely knit social relations in 
which individuals are expected to care only for themselves and their immediate families. 
A collectivist orientation values tightly knit relations in which people expect their broad 
in-group (e.g., extended family, clan) to look after them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty.  
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Power Distance: This dimension concerns social inequality, including 
relations with authority. High power distance indicates that an unequal distribution of 
power in institutions is viewed as legitimate. 
Uncertainty Avoidance: This dimension concerns cultural preferences for 
dealing with uncertainty. Are uncertainty and ambiguity viewed as disturbing and 
threatening or as acceptable challenges? The more threatening uncertainty is 
perceived to be, the more highly valued are beliefs and institutions that provide 
certainty. 
Masculinity/Femininity
3: This dimension concerns the social  implications of 
gender-linked behavior. More “masculine” cultures value achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness, and material success. More “feminine” cultures emphasize relationships, 
modesty, caring for the weak, and interpersonal harmony. 
B.  Norms of Governance and Cultural Values 
We consider the rule of law, corruption, and accountability collectively as 
social norms of governance. “Social norms” refer to what social psychologists call 
injunctive norms. Such norms specify behaviors that are seen as desirable or 
legitimate in the shared view of societal members and whose violation elicits at least 
informal disapproval (Cialdini and Trost 1998; cf. Ellickson 1991; Cooter 1998). 
“Governance” refers to modes of wielding power. International bodies used to focus 
on governance as exercising power in the public sphere but this concept also applies 
in the private sphere (as in corporate governance). Norms of governance thus stand 
                                                 
3 Although this label has elicited negative responses, Hofstede (2001, p. 280) argues that it reflects an 
empirical reality of gender differences that is independent of its normative undesirability.  
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for modes of behavior in situations of power differences that are widely 
approved of or tolerated in a society. 
The core assumption underlying our hypotheses is that the cultural 
environment promotes and facilitates the emergence and perpetuation of particular 
norms of governance. Social norms are grounded in prevailing cultural value 
emphases, because values define broadly what is desirable in a society. Conceptual 
compatibility between general cultural values and more concrete norms therefore is 
necessary for an equilibrium among social institutions to emerge. Modes of wielding 
power that are compatible with prevailing value emphases are more likely to become 
social norms. This compatibility provides the norm with the legitimacy signal that 
triggers social incentive mechanisms for rewarding compliant behavior, and vice 
versa for deviant behavior. Modes of behavior that express values that are deemed 
objectionable or inferior will lack injunctive force and may not voluntarily be adhered 
to. Consequently, governance norms that are incompatible with the cultural 
environment are less likely to take root. 
For these reasons, we propose to see culture as the foundation of social 
institutions.
4 Societies that emphasize individual uniqueness and view individual 
persons as moral equals are likely to develop and sustain institutions that promote 
societal transparency that better enables societal members to plan their independent 
moves. In contrast, societies that emphasize these values less and view the individual 
as an embedded part of hierarchically organized groups are more likely to develop 
institutions that accommodate exercising power from above and that compromise the 
                                                 
4 Readers will readily see the relevance of this proposition to the notion of social capital (Coleman 
1988; Putnam 1993) – an issue that exceeds the current scope.  
 
 
8 
interests of individual persons. The following sections apply this general 
hypothesis to three central institutions. 
1.  The Rule of Law 
We focus on the most basic aspect of the rule of law, often called the 
formalistic or procedural aspect, or, more colloquially, “law and order” (Fuller 
1964/1969; Rawls 1971). This aspect deals with the degree to which the behavior of 
individual persons and government authorities complies with formal legal rules. It is 
immaterial whether the rules are unjust or what political process (democratic or other) 
produced them. The only question is whether the rules are respected. The implicit 
assumption is that ordinarily—i.e., absent severe moral dilemmas—they should be 
(Raz 1979, pp. 212-14). Formally, the duty to obey the law is universal: Virtually 
every legal system calls on people to obey its rules. We are interested, however, in the 
rule of law not as a legal provision but rather as a social norm—a widely accepted 
injunction that promotes law-abidingness irrespective of legal sanctions – just because 
“it’s the law.”  
The essence of the rule of law is that power ought to be used only in ways 
allowed by the law (Dicey 1914). The rule of law covers a broad variety of types of 
power. They range from long-term positions of power held by the state itself (as 
reflected in the German Rechtsstaat doctrine) or state organs (as in the separation of 
powers doctrine) to holding a public office. They also include power inherent in 
holding an executive office in a business corporation and power in short-term, fleeting 
situations that allow opportunistic behavior. 
Endorsing the rule of law as an overarching norm is consistent with societal 
emphases on the cultural orientations of Autonomy and Egalitarianism. The gist of  
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Autonomy is the view of people as bounded entities who should be 
encouraged to cultivate their unique ideas and feelings. A rule-of-law state would 
express this orientation by providing people with a comprehensive set of rights and 
freedoms—e.g., of property and contract and, in democracies, also of speech—and by 
effectively enforcing them. Such an environment clarifies the content and scope of 
people’s entitlements, thus allowing them to better plan their independent moves (cf. 
Raz 1979, p. 214). An emphasis on cultural Egalitarianism, that socializes and exhorts 
societal members to treat one another as moral equals, would also promote a rule-of-
law norm that entitles all to equal protection under the law.  
In contrast, a rule-of-law norm is less likely to find support in societies whose 
culture emphasizes Embeddedness. The key values in such cultures—respect for 
tradition, honoring elders, and obedience—encourage people to seek guidance in 
sources other than the law. The relations of the rule of law to the Harmony/Mastery 
cultural dimension are more ambiguous. Mastery emphasizes assertiveness, which is 
compatible with people standing up for their rights. But Mastery also legitimizes 
using other people if necessary to advance personal or group interests, behavior that 
legal rights are intended to curb. Harmony values emphasize acceptance and 
preservation of the physical and social world, an approach neither compatible nor 
incompatible with a rule-of-law norm. 
2.  Corruption 
Lord Acton (1972, p. 335) deftly captured the connection between power and 
corruption in remarking, “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.” Although there is no universal definition of corrupt behavior, the 
prominent definitions share a common emphasis on use of public office or power for 
private gains (Bardham 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1998). Corruption is antithetical to the  
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rule of law, particularly in the formalistic sense of this term. Adverse effects 
of widespread corruption include entrenching a social norm of disrespect for the law, 
rendering law enforcement agencies and the judiciary dysfunctional, and distorting 
private transactions by infiltrating into the sphere of private law.  
Several economic models seek to explain how corruption may emerge and 
become a stable equilibrium despite its undesirability.
5 History—particularly the 
colonial heritage of countries—has been noted as a factor that may bear on 
international variation in the incidence of corruption (Treisman 2000). But corruption 
researchers share the view that culture, loosely defined, is a major determinant of 
corruption (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1999). Some take a country’s predominant religion 
as a proxy for its culture. Yet there is no agreement about the mechanisms that may 
cause religion to affect the incidence of corruption (see La Porta et al. 1997b; Lipset 
and Lenz 2000; Treisman 2000; Paldam 2001). 
We relate corruption to culture directly by drawing on cultural value 
dimensions. Corruption, in the sense of deriving material gain (bribes) from a power 
position, is incompatible with cultural emphases on Autonomy and Egalitarianism 
because it violates fairness in the pursuit of individual interests. Societal emphases on 
Autonomy and Egalitarianism thus strengthen the social norm against bribe-taking. 
Corruption is more compatible with Hierarchy and Mastery, which legitimize the use 
of power and the exploitation of others in the pursuit of individual or group interests. 
Note that this is reasoning at the cultural, not the individual level. Individuals in 
societies high on Hierarchy may well resent having to pay bribes. Nonetheless, they 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Andvig and Moene (1990); Cadot (1987); Ehrlich and Lui (1999); Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993); Tirole (1996).  
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will pay bribes if required and demand bribes if given the opportunity, 
without considering such conduct appalling. This is because cultural values legitimize 
the social norm that calls for them to do so. 
3.  Accountability 
Accountability is a pervasive concept with a rich history – from Athenian 
democracy through religious injunctions to the evolution of democratic institutions. 
Today, accountability features highly in “good governance” programs, oftentimes as 
shorthand for “democratic accountability.” Whichever of its many definitions one 
prefers, accountability implies power relationships. A norm of accountability provides 
that the party holding power owes certain duties to the party subject to this power. 
Among other things, accountable holders of power are obliged to give an account of 
their decisions or actions (“transparency”). They are expected to explain or justify 
them and, in cases of misconduct, to bear responsibility and make amends. A norm of 
accountability creates feedback channels between the relevant parties. 
The exact rights and obligations of the parties may vary considerably across 
situations even within a single country. For example, although similar in principle, the 
accountability of elected politicians, of civil servants, and of trustees to an estate 
entail different obligations. Consequently, hypotheses that relate accountability to 
cultural orientations must be tailored to the type of accountability in question. The 
sources we use to operationalize accountability concentrate on democratic 
accountability in the public sphere. They weave together aspects of representative 
democracy, civil liberties, and voice in general. 
The cultural orientations of Autonomy and Egalitarianism clearly and directly 
imply a norm of democratic accountability. Various facets of freedom of expression  
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(speech, press, assembly, and demonstration) and of religion express values 
central to Intellectual Autonomy like freedom and broadmindedness. In contrast, 
Embeddedness calls for circumscribing individual freedoms in favor of social order 
and security. Societies high on Embeddedness are therefore more likely to 
compromise individual rights in the name of protecting the interests of the wider 
social group or nation.  
Democratic accountability is also compatible with Egalitarianism as opposed 
to Hierarchy. Egalitarianism emphasizes the moral equality of those subject to state 
power and those who exercise it. Despite formal status differences, an egalitarian 
culture exhorts all voluntarily to promote the interests of all. In contrast, cultural 
Hierarchy legitimizes the pursuit of positions of authority and responses of 
submission to authority. This orientation is diametrically opposed to requiring 
accountability from superiors. Finally, accountability is incompatible with cultural 
Mastery, which legitimizes self-promotion even at the expense of others, in order to 
pursue individual or group interests.. 
C.  Causal Effects and Additional Factors  
Cultural values probably exert first-order influence on the governance norms 
discussed here in terms of promoting compliance with compatible norms. This is 
because the mechanisms that inculcate value preferences in societal members operate 
largely before these people face issues and situations affected by governance norms. 
The process of value acquisition at the individual level takes place unconsciously 
from infancy through adolescence by way of myriad social interactions. Thus, people 
growing up in a law-abiding society would have (on average) acquired value 
preferences that emphasize Autonomy and Egalitarianism generally before they may 
consider breaking the law. A social norm of law-abidingness surely enables people to  
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maintain these values, but this would be a secondary effect because it cannot 
feed back directly into the process of value acquisition at young ages (Cf. Kohlberg 
1984, at least for Western societies). 
Cultural influences on governance are interwoven with the influences of 
numerous other factors. These include economic factors, historical events, and the 
legal institutions that characterize countries. It is difficult to disentangle the causal 
relations among all these factors. Most probably, feedback mechanisms operate 
among culture, economics, and governance in every society, with governance systems 
resting on both legal and non-legal bases. In other words, many of the social 
phenomena discussed in this study are determined endogenously. A comprehensive 
analysis of the effects of culture on governance should consider the complex model of 
relations depicted in Figure 2. Single-headed arrows stand for unidirectional causal 
relationships between constructs. Double-headed arrows represent mutual influence. 
In what follows, we discuss some of these factors and later test their joint relations to 
governance.
6  
[Figure 2 around here] 
The literature contains lively discussions about causal relations among culture 
(sometimes loosely defined), governance, and economic factors.
7 Most writers hold 
that causality runs from governance to economic development, while acknowledging 
the possibility of positive mutual effects (Barro 1999; Kaufmann et al. 1999; Mauro 
1995; Treisman 2000). However, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) argue that “virtuous 
                                                 
6 Legal institutions are not included in the analysis because they would make it unduly complex. We 
return to this point below. 
7 See, for example, Weber (1904/1930); Lal (1998); Casson and Godley (2000); Hofstede (2001); Sen 
(2003); Schwartz (2003).  
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circles” in which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance 
are not always the case. Easterly (2001) reviews a large literature that documents 
negative associations between economic inequality and economic development. He 
presents evidence suggesting that inequality causes underdevelopment through, 
among other things, inferior social institutions (governance). The negative relations 
between economic inequality and governance are consistent with our hypotheses, as 
governance constrains opportunities for exploiting economic power. 
Of the numerous historical factors that might relate to governance, we focus 
on episodes of British rule in countries’ history. There are now several accounts that 
link historical initial conditions (e.g., climate and diseases, land and crops) and 
colonization on the one hand with social institutions and economic development on 
the other hand (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; 2002; Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1997; 2002; Treisman 2000). These works suggest a fundamental distinction 
between countries that have experienced British rule versus countries that have not, 
the latter being either under Latin colonization (Spanish, French, etc.) or none at all 
(see also Easterly and Levine 2003). We therefore expect a history of British rule to 
have a general positive relation with governance. 
III.  DATA 
A.  Measures of Culture 
The Schwartz Data: Respondents from every inhabited continent completed a 
value survey anonymously in their native language (see Schwartz 1999). They rated 
the importance of 56 single values “as guiding principles in MY life.” Each value was 
followed in parentheses by a short explanatory phrase (e.g., WEALTH [material 
possessions, money]). Responses ranged from 7 (of supreme importance) to 3  
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(important) to 0 (not important) to -1 (opposed to my values). Examination of 
separate multidimensional scaling analyses of the 56 values within each of the 
different nations established that 45 of the values have equivalent meanings across 
cultures. Only these 45 values were therefore included in the analyses that assessed 
the existence of the theorized cultural dimensions. A Similarity Structure Analysis 
(SSA) of these values across nations supported the theory of cultural orientations and 
the a priori indices developed to measure the profiles of nations on three cultural 
value dimensions.
8 
Data for comparing nations might ideally be obtained from representative 
national samples. Even with such samples, however, inferences about national culture 
require caution. National populations differ in their demographic composition (e.g., 
distributions of age, education, occupation), and these different distributions affect 
average value priorities.
9 Consequently, even when comparing the values of 
representative national samples, it would still be necessary to control for demographic 
differences between nations before we could confidently ascribe observed differences 
in value priorities to national culture alone. Moreover, many nations contain more 
than one sub-cultural group, so a single characterization based on a representative 
national sample is still misleading. 
                                                 
8 The SSA was performed on data from over 65,000 respondents from 195 samples in 67 nations, 
gathered between 1988 and 1993. See Borg and Lingoes (1987); Guttman (1968). 
9 The values of particular demographic groups (such as the elderly) are influenced not only by the 
prevailing culture, but by the unique experiences to which these groups are exposed by virtue of their 
social locations. Observed differences between the mean values of representative national samples 
reflect, therefore, not only the prevailing culture. They also reflect current differences in the 
demographic composition of national populations.  
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The approach taken instead was to obtain samples matched on critical 
characteristics, largely from the dominant cultural group in each nation.
10 The focal 
type of sample was urban school teachers who teach the full range of subjects in 
grades 3-12 of the most common type of school system. No single occupational group 
represents a culture, but school teachers may have a number of advantages for 
characterizing national value priorities. As a group, they play an explicit role in value 
socialization, they are presumably key carriers of culture, and they probably reflect 
the mid-range of prevailing value priorities in most societies. By focusing on this 
single matched group, it was possible to obtain a relatively pure representation of 
national differences in value priorities, net of the influences of other national 
differences.
11 
To compute the mean importance of a cultural orientation in a nation, the 
importance that members of the sample from that nation attributed to the set of value 
items that represent the orientation was averaged. For cross-national comparisons, 
sample differences in scale use were eliminated by centering the importance ratings of 
all seven orientations within each sample around its mean. 
Analyses of the profiles of nations on the seven cultural orientations reveal 
that they form six major cultural groups: English-speaking, West European, East-
Central European, Far Eastern, Latin American, and African. Some of the analyses in 
this study use this grouping of nations as the unit of reference. 
                                                 
10 In line with the vast majority of cross-cultural studies, this study compares nations as cultural 
groups. Where national boundaries encompassed heterogeneous groups with separate distinctive 
cultures, their data refer to the culture of the dominant group. 
11 To test the robustness of conclusions from the teacher samples, Schwartz (1999) performed parallel 
analyses with data from samples of college students, from a wide variety of majors, in each of 40 
nations. Parallel analyses were performed with older vs. younger samples and male vs. female samples 
in each of 52 countries The results supported the cultural value dimensions and yielded similar orders 
of nations on dimensions  
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The Hofstede Data:  Hofstede’s (1980; 2001) study originated in an 
audit of company morale among the employees of the IBM corporation around the 
world at two points of time: around 1968 and around 1972. Factor analysis of country 
mean scores in 50 countries and three regions produced the four dimensions described 
above. Hofstede notes the criticism that “IBMers are very special people, not at all 
representative for our country”. He argues, however, that the crucial requirement is 
that the samples be well-matched across countries, not that they be representative. He 
asserts that comparing IBM subsidiaries shows national culture differences with 
unusual clarity because they are so homogeneous in terms of employer, kind of work, 
and education level (Hofstede 1991, p. 252; 2001, p. 73).  
B.  Measures of Governance 
The measures of governance are drawn from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-
Lobatón’s (1999) first round of governance indices. We use three indices called ‘Rule 
of Law’, ‘Graft’, and ‘Voice and Accountability.’ These indices gauge the perceived 
compliance in each country with the three norms specified above. Scores on these 
indices range from around -2.5 to around 2.5, with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. The indicators consist primarily of qualitative data, covering a wide 
range of topics, obtained from varied organizations, and representing the perspectives 
of diverse observers.
12 The polls used by Kaufmann et al. enabled them to integrate 
more indicators and to cover a broader set of issues than indices like those constructed 
by the International Country Risk Guide or Transparency International.
  13Unlike the 
                                                 
12 For a detailed discussion of the poll-of-polls methodology, see Treisman (2000, pp. 409-14). 
13 See, for example, La Porta et al. (1999) (using ICRG’s index); Treisman (2000) (using Transparency 
International’s index). We repeated the analyses reported below with the indices of ICRG and 
Transparency International and received similar results.  
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Schwartz indices of culture, however, the governance indices are not based 
on data whose consistency of meaning across nations was evaluated.  
The rule of law index mainly measures the traditional concept of “law and 
order”, incidence of crime, enforceability of private and government contracts, and 
respect for property rights. The non-corruption index gauges corruption among public 
officials and the frequency of “additional payments” to “get things done.” The 
accountability index concentrates on aspects of democratic accountability, civil 
liberties, and political rights. In sum, the indices measure the extent to which the 
injunctions of the three social norms are in fact followed in each country.  
C. Other Data 
To represent economic development in each country, we use the natural 
logarithm of the average of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the period 
1990-1999. The data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Averaging GDP data over a ten-year period serves two goals: First, it smoothes out 
short-term fluctuations. This is particularly appropriate because we deal with long 
lasting social phenomena. Second, this time frame covers the early 1990s, during 
which most of Schwartz’s cultural measures were sampled, and the late 1990s 
(specifically, 1997-1998) to which the governance indices refer. 
Economic inequality is measured with Gini coefficients based on surveys 
conducted between 1990 and 1999, taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. Finally, we use a dummy variable index based on Treisman (2000) and the 
CIA World Factbook to indicate whether a country is the United Kingdom or had 
been under British rule of any kind (colony, mandate area, etc.).  
  
 
 
19 
IV.  RESULTS 
A.  Norms of Governance and Cultural Value Dimensions 
Table 1 gives a first approximation of the central finding of this study: Social 
norms of governance correlate strongly and systematically with cultural value 
dimensions. First consider the rule of law index. Countries with high scores for the 
prevalence of a rule of law are also high on Affective and Intellectual Autonomy and 
Egalitarianism, and low on Embeddedness, Hierarchy, and Mastery. Thus, the rule of 
law norm relates significantly to six of the seven cultural dimensions on which 
countries differ. We also note, without elaboration, that governance norms also 
correlates significantly with cultural dimensions distinguished by Hofstede. 
Widespread compliance with legal rules that govern interactions in the public and 
private spheres—namely, having a “law and order” tradition—is associated with a 
distinct profile of cultural values. Apparently, the duty to obey the law is not a 
universal principle of equal importance regardless of cultural diversity. 
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Table 1. Relations of Norms of Governance to Cultural Value Dimensions 
across Countries (Pearson Correlations) 
A. Dimensions from Schwartz 
 Norm  of  Governance 
Cultural Dimension  Rule of Law  Non-Corruption Accountability 
Embeddedness  -.64  *** -.64*** -.70*** 
Hierarchy  -.47  *** -.51*** -.67*** 
Mastery  -.25  ** -.26** -.35*** 
Affective Autonomy  .54 ***  .55***  .52*** 
Intellectual Autonomy  .49 ***  .48***  .55*** 
Egalitarianism .52  ***  .60***  .61*** 
Harmony .09    .09  .40*** 
   Number of Nations 53    52  53 
 
B. Dimensions from Hofstede  
 Norm  of  Governance 
Cultural Dimension  Rule of Law  Non-Corruption Accountability 
Individualism .66  ***  .71***  .72*** 
Power  Distance  -.61  *** -.67*** -.66*** 
Uncertainty Avoidance  -.31 **  -.36***  -.11 
Masculinity  -.10   -.15 -.02 
   Number of Nations 49    49  49 
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%. 
Significance levels are one-tailed.  
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The findings for non-corruption are almost identical to those for the 
rule of law. This was to be expected because country scores for the rule of law and for 
non-corruption correlate very highly (r = .94). It may derive from the fact that 
corruption and the rule of law are antithetical. Yet, the survey items used by 
Kaufmann et al. to construct the rule of law and non-corruption indices do not 
overlap. The two indices purport to gauge separate social phenomena. Of course, 
respondents’ answers to questions about the rule of law and corruption in a particular 
country may be interdependent. Nevertheless, the correlations of non-corruption with 
the cultural dimensions are informative. They strongly suggest that corruption is 
substantially grounded in the prevailing culture in a country. The correlations with 
particular dimensions point to the nature of the cultural supports for corruption. 
Next consider accountability. In line with the hypotheses, national scores on 
the index of democratic accountability correlate significantly with all seven of the 
value dimensions from Schwartz. Unlike the rule of law and non-corruption indices, 
the accountability index exhibits a positive correlation with Harmony. 
Considering the entire correlation matrix of social norms and value 
dimensions in Table 1, the overall consistency of the findings for the three governance 
indices is striking. It supports the notion that the three norms indeed belong to a 
common category – the category of norms of governance. The systematic correlations 
of these norms with underlying cultural dimensions suggest that they all draw their 
injunctive force from similar fundamental cultural orientations. 
B.  Norms of Governance across Cultural Regions 
We next examine whether culturally similar groups of nations exhibit similar 
norms of governance. Table 2 presents the mean scores for the three governance  
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norms in each of the world’s cultural regions identified by Schwartz and the 
differences between the regions. These differences are tested statistically with Tukey 
tests, appropriate for post hoc pair-wise comparisons, and with the less stringent t-
tests, that are commonly used in the governance literature. With regard to all three 
norms of governance, the English-speaking and West European regions exhibit 
similar high levels. These two regions score significantly higher than the African, East 
European, Far Eastern, and Latin American regions on the rule of law and non-
corruption. There are no significant differences among the latter sets of nations. With 
regard to accountability, the English-speaking and West European regions again score 
higher than all the other regions. In this case, however, the nations in the African 
region exhibit somewhat lower levels of accountability than those in Eastern Europe. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Mean Scores for the Rule of Law, Non-Corruption and 
Accountability across Cultural Regions Identified by Schwartz                                       
 
  Differences between Means of Regions 
A. Rule of Law Mean  AF   EE ES FE LA   
Africa  (AF)  .21           
Eastern  Europe  (EE)  .16  .05         
English-speaking (ES)  1.47  1.26 *** 1.30***       
Far East (FE)  .62  .41   .46  .85*#      
Latin America (LA)  -.05  .26   .21  1.52*** .67    
Western Europe (WE)  1.41  1.20 *** 1.25*** .06  .79**# 1.46 *** 
B. Non-Corruption             
Africa  (AF)  -.23           
Eastern  Europe  (EE)  .07  .30          
 
 
23 
English-speaking (ES)  1.67  1.90 *** 1.60***       
Far East (FE)  .40  .63   .33  1.27***     
Latin America (LA)  -.10  .12   .17  1.77*** .51    
Western Europe (WE)  1.58  1.80 *** 1.51*** .09  1.17*** 1.68 *** 
C. Accountability             
Africa  (AF)  -.33           
Eastern  Europe  (EE)  .62  .94  *##       
English-speaking (ES)  1.43  1.76 *** .82*##       
Far East (FE)  .04  .37   .58  1.39***     
Latin America (LA)  .35  .68   .26  1.08**# .31    
Western Europe (WE)  1.47  1.80 *** .85**# .04  1.43*** 1.12 *** 
Significance by both Tukey and t tests: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%; other 
levels of significance by t test: **# or *## at 1% and *# at 5%. 
                                                                                                                      
These results point to the existence of two cultural mega-regions in the world, in 
terms of levels of governance. One mega-region consists of the English-speaking and 
West European nations and one consists of the remaining regions. This finding 
supports the notion that the social institutions captured by Kaufmann et al’s indices 
draw on cultural values that prevail in Western societies but not in others. Although 
not all nations in each mega-region may differ from all the nations in the other mega-
region, overall, compliance with norms of governance is substantially higher in the 
first mega-region than in the second. Such substantial differences in governance are 
likely to have consequences in many important domains that affect the welfare of 
citizens. For instance, Kaufmann et al. (2000) show that an improvement of one 
standard deviation—a one unit increase here—in the rule of law or non-corruption  
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indices is associated with between a two- and fourfold increase in per capita 
income, a decline in infant mortality of similar magnitude, and an improvement of 15-
25 percentage points in literacy levels. 
C.  Adding Other Factors to the Picture 
1.  Methodological Notes 
As noted above, the literature on possible causes and effects of governance is 
in flux. The goal of this study is to enrich the existing picture by pointing to the 
pivotal role of cultural factors in sustaining social norms of governance. This section 
explicates the extent to which cultural orientations can predict the prevalence of 
governance norms even when other factors are taken into account. Fully resolving 
causality issues is beyond the scope of the present study but we address some aspects 
below. In considering the regressions, note that we use only one polar orientation 
from each bipolar dimension. These polar orientations represent the 
Embeddedness/Autonomy, Hierarchy/Egalitarianism, and Harmony/Mastery 
dimensions of culture. Finally, although Kaufmann et al.’s poll-of-polls methodology 
allows for weighing score variance in the regressions, doing so with the current data 
increases the overall predicted variance only slightly. We therefore opted to use the 
more conservative and familiar OLS method. 
2.  The Rule of Law 
Table 3 presents regressions of the rule of law on culture alone and together 
with various combinations of economic and historical indicators. Countries’ cultural 
profiles alone (column 1) explain almost half of the variance in the level of 
compliance with the law. As hypothesized, Embeddedness and Hierarchy predict 
lower levels of compliance with the law. This reflects both their negative effects and  
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the hypothesized positive influence of the orientations opposed to them on 
the bipolar cultural dimensions, Autonomy and Egalitarianism. Thus, the results for 
culture alone are impressive. A British heritage predicts higher levels of the rule of 
law (column 2). Introducing this historical factor eliminates the effects of the 
Harmony (Mastery) dimension of culture.
14 The other two cultural dimensions, 
Embeddedness (Autonomy) and Hierarchy (Egalitarianism), continue to predict 
significantly, with nearly identical coefficients. The association between these cultural 
emphases and the rule of law thus appears unrelated to the historical fact of having a 
British heritage and to other factors it may capture, like a common law legal system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The countries with a British rule heritage (both English-speaking and non-English-speaking) on 
average score lower (at 1%) on cultural Harmony than countries without such heritage.  
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Table 3. Regressions of the Rule of Law on Schwartz Cultural Dimensions 
and Other Factors 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Embeddedness  -.59 ***  -.58 ***  -.66 *** -.60*** -.58*** -.49*** -.52*** -.49 *** 
  (5.10)   (5.75)   (6.21)   (5.97) (6.71) (4.12) (6.16) (5.08)   
Hierarchy  -.31  ** -.33  ** -.35  *** -.31*** -.34*** -.27** -.29*** -.30  *** 
  (2.59)   (3.14)   (3.20)   (3.01) (3.80) (2.54) (3.33) (3.30)   
Harmony  -.26  **  -.04   -.23  **  -.31*** -.11 -.03 -.09 -.11   
  (2.27)   (.37)   (2.18)   (3.08)  (1.02) (.87) (.91)  (1.06)   
British heritage     .42 ***       .35*** .33*** .29*** .18  
     (4.06)         (3.84) (3.52) (3.21) (1.07)   
Gini  coefficient              -.27*** -.25** -.23** -.22** -.22  ** 
             (2.70) (2.82) (2.64) (2.61) (2.58)   
Log  GDP/Capita              .16     
              ( 1 . 1 2 )      
Protestantism                 .20**  .20 ** 
                 (2.46)  (2.37)  
Fractionalization                -.08   
                (.93)   
Common  law                .13   
                (.79)   
Adjusted R
2  .47   .60   .63   .68 .76 .76 .79 .78   
F  16.62 ***  20.53 ***  25.60 *** 23.98*** 28.70*** 24.29*** 28.00*** 20.94 *** 
N  53   53   45   45 45 45 45 45   
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%. 
Standardized beta coefficients. t-statistic absolute values are reported in parentheses. 
Columns (3)-(8) relate to the same set of countries.   
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Economic inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, correlates 
negatively with the rule of law, irrespective of a country’s cultural profile (column 4). 
To allow comparability, we report regression results for cultural dimensions alone in 
the sub-sample for which the Gini coefficient is available (column 3). The variance 
predicted by culture alone in this sub-sample is 63%. Including the Gini coefficient 
increases the adjusted R-squared to 68%. The coefficients for Embeddedness and 
Hierarchy do not change significantly and the coefficient for Harmony strengthens 
somewhat. Economic inequality is apparently inimical to the rule of law. Higher 
inequality may provide the wealthy with more opportunities to exploit their economic 
power to infringe on the rights of the poor. At the same time, people who face higher 
levels of economic inequality may be more willing to break the law. 
The next regression (column 5) adds both economic inequality and British 
heritage to the cultural dimensions as predictors of the rule of law. This combination 
of cultural, economic, and historical factors explains 76% of the variance. All but the 
Harmony (Mastery) dimension contribute uniquely to the variance in the rule of law. 
Adding economic inequality and British heritage has little effect on the coefficients 
for Embeddedness and Hierarchy. These four variables have independent associations 
with levels of legality. Taken together, this parsimonious set of variables permits good 
prediction of the countries in which people obey the law to a lesser or greater degree. 
It may well point to some of the reasons why people obey the law.
15 
 
 
                                                 
15 In this view, compliance with the law stems from a combination of cultural, economic, and historical 
factors. Hence, Tyler’s (1990) theory regarding the role of individual perceptions about the fairness of 
laws and legal procedures may need to be modified to take account of prevailing culture as well.  
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3.  Corruption  
This section repeats the same regression analyses for predicting non-
corruption levels. Because the indices for the rule of law and for non-corruption are 
highly correlated conceptually and empirically, similar results indeed obtain (Table 
4). To avoid repetition, we compare the two sets of results in general and leave it to 
readers to examine the tables in detail.  
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Table 4. Regressions of Non-Corruption on Schwartz Cultural Dimensions 
and Other Factors 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Embeddedness  -.58 ***  -.57 ***  -.68 *** -.64*** -.63*** -.48*** -.55*** -.51 *** 
 (5.20)    (6.20) 
  (7.54) 
  (7.19) (8.21) (4.86) (8.20) (6.87)   
Hierarchy  -.39 ***  -.42 ***  -.44 *** -.40*** -.44*** -.33*** -.37*** -.37 *** 
  (3.31)   (4.29)   (4.63)   (4.40) (5.52) (3.70) (5.32) (5.36)   
Harmony  -.29 **  -.06   -.31 *** -.36*** -.18*  -.15*  -.16**  -.19 ** 
 (2.61)    (.58)    (3.39)   (3.99) (1.94) (1.73) (2.06) (2.38)   
British heritage     .46 ***       .31*** .28*** .22*** -.02  
     (4.70)         (3.76) (3.45) (3.07)  (.11)   
Gini coefficient           -.19**  -.16*  -.13*  -.12*  -.15 ** 
             (2.06) (1.99) (1.71) (1.80) (2.07)   
Log  GDP/Capita              .27**      
              ( 2 . 3 0 )      
Protestantism                 .28*** .27 *** 
                 (4.16)  (4.00)  
Fractionalization                -.04   
                ( - . 6 1 )    
Common  law                .25   
                ( 1 . 3 5 )    
Adjusted R
2  .51   .66   .73   .75 .81 .83 .87 .89   
F  18.87 ***  25.90 ***  38.81 *** 32.52*** 37.63*** 35.77*** 47.70*** 36.47 *** 
N  52   52   44   44 44 44 44 44   
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%. 
Standardized beta coefficients. t-statistic absolute values are reported in parentheses. 
Columns (3)-(8) relate to the same set of countries.   
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The regression coefficients for non-corruption are similar in sign and 
magnitude to those obtained for the rule of law. Somewhat more variance is predicted 
in non-corruption, ranging from 4 to 10% higher for corresponding models. The 
model that includes national cultural profiles, economic inequality, and a British 
heritage as predictors explains 81% of the variance in perceived corruption (column 
5). For non-corruption, however, all variables, including the Harmony (Mastery) 
cultural dimension, contribute significantly. High cultural Embeddedness (vs. 
Autonomy) again emerges as the strongest predictor. The cultural dimensions are 
somewhat stronger predictors and the other variables somewhat weaker predictors of 
non-corruption than for the rule of law. 
4.  Accountability 
Like the norms of legality and non-corruption, the level of democratic 
accountability in the public sphere also relates clearly to features of the encompassing 
national culture. Results of the regressions presented in Table 5 are consistent with the 
results for the former two norms, but they are not identical. In the basic cultural model 
(column 1), Embeddedness and Hierarchy have a significant, negative, and relatively 
equal role, whereas Harmony has virtually no effect. These variables alone predict 
62% of the variance. Consistent with our hypotheses, societal emphases on 
Embeddedness (vs. Autonomy) and Hierarchy (vs. Egalitarianism) values are inimical 
to the prevalence of democratic accountability.  
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Table 5. Regressions of Democratic Accountability on Schwartz Cultural 
Dimensions and Other Factors 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
Embeddedness  -.49 ***  -.48 ***  -.51 *** -.47*** -.45*** -.24**  -.41*** -.40 *** 
 (4.97)    (5.25) 
  (4.92) 
  (4.58) (4.81) (2.00) (4.27) (3.81)   
Hierarchy  -.42 ***  -.44 ***  -.44 *** -.40*** -.43*** -.28**  -.39*** -.44 *** 
  (4.11)   (4.53)   (4.03)   (3.85) (4.41) (2.50) (3.98) (4.41)   
Harmony  .03   .17  *  .01    -.06 .11 .14 .12 .09   
  (.32)   (1.67)   (.09)   (.59)  (.96) (1.33) (1.08)  (.78)   
British heritage     .27 **       .28*** .23**  .24**  -.07  
     (2.07)         (2.86) (2.44) (2.34)  (.37)   
Gini coefficient           -.21**  -.19**  -.16*  -.17*  -.19 ** 
             (2.09) (2.04) (1.79) (1.82) (2.06)   
Log  GDP/Capita              .36**      
              ( 2 . 5 2 )      
Protestantism                 .15  -12  
                 (1.59)  (1.32)  
Fractionalization                -.02   
                (.24)   
Common  law                .35  * 
                ( 2 . 0 1 )    
Adjusted R
2  .62   .67   .64   .67 .72 .75 .73 .74   
F  28.89 ***  26.95 ***  26.94 *** 22.98*** 23.30*** 23.13*** 20.60*** 16.82 *** 
N  53   53   45   45 45 45 45 45   
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Standardized beta coefficients. t-statistic absolute values are reported in parentheses. 
Columns (3)-(8) relate to the same set of countries.  
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Both a heritage of British rule (column 2) and economic inequality 
(column 4) add to the variance in accountability that is accounted for. Together, the 
cultural, historical, and economic factors predict 72% of the variance in accountability 
(column 5). Consistent with the previous findings, economic inequality has a negative 
effect on the level of accountability: The larger the differences between rich and poor, 
the less likely are the politically powerful (and, plausibly, richer) to be accountable to 
weaker constituencies. A heritage of British rule increases accountability. 
5.  Taking Economic Development into Account 
Researchers have noted that including governance as an independent variable 
in regressions to predict economic development (or vice versa) entails downward 
estimation biases in light of potential reverse causality. Efforts to sidestep this 
problem usually employ instrumental variables in two-step least squares (2SLS) 
regressions. But such efforts are not always successful or feasible.
16 Nonetheless, we 
include economic development as a predictor in the regressions in the interest of 
assessing whether even such underestimates point to a significant role for cultural and 
historical factors.
17 
Column 6 in each of Tables 3-5 presents results of predicting the rule of law, 
non-corruption, and democratic accountability, respectively, simultaneously with the 
three cultural variables, British heritage, economic inequality, and with economic 
development. Surprisingly, for the rule of law (Table 3), economic development 
exhibits no independent predictive power. Neither does it add to the variance in the 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, Kaufmann et al. (1999); Hall and Jones (1999); Mauro (1995). The endogeneity of 
GDP per capita led Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) to exclude it from their analyses.   
17If Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) are correct in claiming that development does not feed back positively 
to governance, including development in the regressions may be less of a problem in this regard.  
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rule of law accounted for by the other variables. For non-corruption (Table 4) 
and democratic accountability (Table 5), GDP per capita has significant positive 
coefficients. The three cultural dimensions, British heritage, and economic inequality 
retain predictive power, but their strength is reduced by including GDP per capita.  
The addition of GDP per capita to the already high levels of variance 
explained is very small (from 0% for the rule of law to 3% for accountability). When 
we entered GDP per capita last in hierarchical regressions, the added variance it 
explains in non-corruption and in accountability was not significant. Hence, the 
models that include and that do not include this measure of economic development 
may be considered equivalent. The regression analyses including GDP per capita 
support the view that governance and economic development are associated. They 
suggest, however, that cultural, historical, and economic inequality play an 
independent part in explaining governance across countries. Adding economic 
development to these factors yields little if any additional predictive power. Thus 
these are fundamental factors whose relations to governance may be interpreted 
without reference to economic development. 
6.  Competing Accounts 
Columns 7-8 in each of Tables 3-5 present regressions in which we control for 
factors that may be considered as competing accounts. Of the countless potential 
candidates we chose variables that are commonly used in the literature and could have 
a broad impact on social institutions. Specifically, we introduce a dummy variable for 
whether the country’s dominant religion is Protestantism. A country’s dominant 
religion certainly can infuse its culture with normative injunctions. Weber 
(1904/1930) associated Protestantism with individualism. Others (e.g., La Porta et al. 
1999) distinguish Protestantism from other denominations as being less hierarchical.  
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A dummy variable for common law origin of the country’s legal system 
captures differences in the content of legal rules as well as propensities for legal 
formalism (Djankov et al. 2003). A variable for ethnic fractionalization, drawn from 
Alesina et al. (2002), captures externally determined levels of homogeneity in 
societies. 
Readers are referred to the tables for detailed results. In brief, none of these 
control variables causes cultural Embeddedness (Autonomy) or Hierarchy 
(Egalitarianism) to lose much of their predictive power for governance. Protestantism 
predicts positively only for the rule of law and non-corruption but with weaker 
coefficients than Embeddedness and Hierarchy. Adding variables for Catholic or 
Moslem denominations did not change this picture. The substantial overlap between 
having a British rule heritage and a common law origin probably accounts for both 
having non-significant coefficients for the rule of law and non-corruption, and for the 
shift of significance to the common law variable for accountability. Finally, a striking 
finding is the near-zero coefficient for ethnic fractionalization in the presence of 
variables for culture and economic inequality. This does not suggest that the makeup 
of society is unimportant (see Mauro 1995; Hall and Jones 1999; Easterly 2001). 
Possibly, it is cultural orientations that mediate between fractionalization and 
institutional quality as the latter is reflected in social norms. Ethnic fractionalization 
increases the salience of one’s ingroup affiliation and is therefore associated with 
Embeddedness (Schwartz 2003). Introducing an interaction term of Embeddedness 
and ethnic fractionalization did not change the results, however. 
7.  Toward Discerning Causality 
A notable feature of the governance literature is its focus on discerning 
causality between social institutions and other national characteristics. Researchers  
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have gone to great lengths to construct instrumental variables that would be 
considered immune to reverse causality, often turning to historically determined 
factors (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2000). Historical variables may not 
be available even in theory for all cultural dimensions, and contemporary variables 
are susceptible to the fact that cultural value emphases transcend particular life 
situations such that their imprint is pervasive. Nor are there time series for cultural 
value dimensions available at present.
18  
As posited above, the mechanism that links cultural orientations with social 
norms of governance does not preclude reverse causality. Current psychological 
theories imply, however, that feedback influence of governance norms on culture may 
be secondary. In our view, the relative stability of culture versus governance should 
equally concern policy-makers as does the direction of causality. We next present 
some evidence that may shed light on both issues. 
Table 6 presents regressions of the three governance norms on three value 
dimensions identified by Hofstede, British heritage, and economic inequality. Only 
the coefficients of Individualism and Power Distance are significant (economic 
inequality is weakly significant only for the rule of law). Recall that the Hofstede 
dataset originates in data collected nearly two generations ago. This allows one to 
consider the cultural data roughly as coming from a lagged period even in the 
timescales that are relevant for cultural change. Because these dimensions are 
conceptually different than the Schwartz dimensions they cannot be used directly as 
instruments. These regressions do show, however, that national cultural profiles of 
                                                 
18 The World Values Survey led by Ronald Inglehart has gone through several rounds for some 
countries. Cross-national differences in responses have been found to be stable, however (Inglehart and 
Baker 2000).  
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past generations are strong predictors of contemporary social institutions. 
These results suggest that these social factors may be stable over time, and, indirectly, 
point to the direction of causality from culture to governance. 
 
 
Table 6. Regressions of Governance Norms on Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and 
Other Factors 
  Rule of Law  Non-Corruption Accountability   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Individualism  .41  *** .56  *** .43  *** .62*** .54*** .60***
  (2.81)   (4.10)   (3.29)   (5.29) (4.10) (4.15) 
Power  Distance  -.32  ** -.25  ** -.35  *** -.36*** -.33** -.29** 
  (2.27)   (2.00)   (2.78)   (3.33) (2.60) (2.17) 
Uncertainty  Avoid  -.11   .06    -.15   .01 .13 .10 
 (.99)    (.50)    (1.49)   (.92)  (1.27) (.79) 
British heritage     -.13      -.15    -.14 
     (1.11)      (1.54)    (.28) 
Gini coefficient     -.21 *     -.03    -.07 
     (1.80)      (.32)    (.56) 
Adjusted R
2  .46   .65   .57   .74 .56 .60 
F  14.85  *** 16.75  *** 22.00  *** 24.78*** 21.67*** 13.63***
N  49   43   49   43 49 43 
*** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Standardized beta coefficients. t-statistic absolute values are reported in parentheses. 
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V.  DISCUSSION 
Some 2500 years ago, the city of Athens sentenced Socrates to death for 
religious heresy and corrupting the youth. Socrates refused to escape from jail. The 
“Laws,” he argued, would come and tell him that by escaping he would break his 
agreement with them and undermine the stability of the state (Plato 1977). Socrates’s 
position is often presented as the classic arguments for the duty to obey the law and, 
generally, for the importance of the rule of law for social order. At about the same 
time, in equally powerful terms Confucius derided the rule of law as a means for 
establishing social order in China. In the Confucian vision, social harmony and 
righteousness rather than justice are the symbol of the ideal society.
 Contemporary 
scholars continue to debate the validity of these two positions. But Socrates and 
Confucius remain fine examples of the diametrical stances toward promoting social 
order through the rule of law that cultures may embody. 
The current study provides empirical findings relevant to this ancient 
controversy. Rather than viewing culture merely as a legacy of generations past, we 
operationalize culture as a contemporary social reality. We draw on theories from 
cross-cultural psychology that identify key dimensions on which national cultures can 
be compared. We have used national scores on these dimensions to examine relations 
of culture to the rule of law. The analyses reveal substantial and consistent links 
between the cultural emphases in societies and levels of the rule of law. Largely 
similar links are also found between culture and non-corruption and accountability.   
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The similarity of the associations of national culture with levels of the 
rule of law, non-corruption, and accountability supports the notion that governance 
norms form a general system of social norms that rests on cultural foundations. Of 
course, good governance is not entirely a product of culture. As we have seen, both 
economic and historical factors also account for substantial variation in governance. 
Yet, culture makes its independent contribution over and above these factors.  
Consistent with previous research, we document generally positive relations 
between economic development and governance. Whatever the causal processes that 
link economics and governance, cultural value emphases constitute an essential 
component in—if not a determinant of—governance systems. Cultural orientations 
apparently foster and strengthen compliance with governance norms. At the same 
time, these norms give concrete expression to abstract cultural orientations in 
regulating human relations and transactions. Since the social phenomena discussed in 
this study are interrelated, policy formation should consider, in addition to the 
direction of causal links, also which components in these social systems may be less 
susceptible to change.  
The theories and data on which we draw suggest that cultural orientations 
change slowly, over time spans of decades and centuries. Cultural orientations 
represent general societal emphases that are deeply ingrained in the functioning of 
major societal institutions, in widespread practices, in symbols and traditions, and, 
through adaptation and socialization, in the values of individuals. This process of 
value acquisition is sensitive to actual circumstances and implicit cues more than to 
formal reform and indoctrination (Schwartz, Bardi, and Bianchi 2000). As a result, 
cultural value emphases may preserve and perpetuate the imprint of ancient 
intellectual legacies and historical initial conditions (Inglehart and Baker 2000;  
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Schwartz and Ros 1995). To the extent that cultural emphases express 
societal responses to ecological factors (e.g., ethnic fractionalization), the relative 
stability of such factors may further entrench prevailing orientations. This stability of 
cultural orientations may impede reform and induce path-dependence in social 
change. The strength of linkage between governance norms and culture documented 
here lends support to the view that certain cultural profiles might create vicious circles 
of underdevelopment (Harrison and Huntington 2000; Greif 1994; see also North 
1990; Williamson 2000).  
The present findings, thus, have significant implications for people and 
institutions engaged in development projects around the world and, in particular, in 
institutional reform programs. Policy makers declare that culture must be factored into 
development programs.
19 But how this should be done is far from obvious. Particular 
cultural profiles in major world regions are less compatible with “good governance,” 
as defined in these programs, than the profiles in West European and English-
speaking countries. In our view, these findings warrant serious rethinking of 
development programs. 
The insight that culture underlies governance does not necessarily imply that 
countries scoring low on the governance indices are doomed because of their cultural 
endowment. But the assumption that certain cultural profiles are more conductive to 
good governance poses a grave dilemma for policy makers. Domestic political leaders 
may find it difficult to run campaigns that draw on foreign values: the citizenry may 
                                                 
19 Consider the concluding statement in the World Bank’s Governance and Poverty Toolkit: “Perhaps 
most important for sustainability [of institutional reforms] is the match between the design of reforms 
and the environment in which they must take root if they are to be effective. It is important to 
understand the degree of rule-respect in the society, the extent of informality, the role of informal 
networks and the way in which power and influence are exercised, if reforms are to be relevant to their 
institutional context.” (Girishankar 2001, p. 36).   
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feel that they are alien or resent their foreignness. International agencies may 
hesitate to promote policies that can readily be depicted as a new form of imperialism. 
And efforts to transplant cultural orientations or to replace entire value systems are 
likely to prove difficult.  
An alternative approach for designing effective governance reforms would 
entail decoupling culture and governance and reconstructing culture-compatible 
governance systems. In this view, “good Asian governance” could be different from, 
but just as good as, a West European version of governance. For instance, an ideal-
type of governance that drew on Confucian elements might be more appealing to 
people in certain Asian countries and thus easier to implement. In the Confucian view, 
social order rests, in addition to righteousness, on relationships of superiority and 
subordination. In ancient Chinese ideology it was said that “equal queens, equal sons, 
equal powers and equal cities—all lead to disorder” (Young 1981, p. 36). Indeed, 
economically successful Asian countries were sometimes characterized as having 
“authoritarian” regimes (e.g., Zakaria 1994). The issue of “Asian values” and their 
relations to economic development and human rights is a thorny one. Our findings 
indicate that societal emphases on Hierarchy may be conductive to corruption and 
inimical to democratic accountability and to the rule of law. Whether governance 
systems that draw on such cultural emphases can be successful in the long run (and 
how this should be judged) is debatable and exceeds the scope of this study. 
The present findings suggest, however, that aspects of authority and hierarchy 
constitute only part of the picture. The Autonomy/Embeddedness dimension may 
point to the most fundamental issue, even when other aspects are taken into account. 
Providing people with comprehensive rights and freedoms—and, more 
fundamentally, with ample individual choice—runs counter to the societal emphasis  
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on Embeddedness that is common in many Asian countries. At least in 
countries influenced by Confucian traditions, such cultural emphases are further 
accompanied by deeply rooted epistemologies and cognitive styles that differ 
markedly from those prevailing in the United States, for example (Nisbett et al. 2001; 
Peng et al. 2001). It follows that policies that champion strengthening individual 
agency—such as Sen’s (1999) “development as freedom” thesis or the World Bank’s 
empowerment strategy—may be especially difficult to implement in these countries. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This study seeks to advance our understanding of the ways in which culture 
matters. It shows how social norms concerning the rule of law, non-corruption, and 
accountability—whose merit may seem universal and self-evident to some—vary 
across cultural regions of the world. It reveals the associations of these norms with the 
prevailing culture in different nations. The relations of culture to governance norms 
are substantial even when critical economic and historical factors are considered. 
These findings may be helpful in assessing legal systems and economic mechanisms. 
More generally, they suggest a framework for understanding the relations between 
fundamental institutions of social order.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix 
Appendix 2. Country Samples and Classification into Cultural Regions 
Country Schwartz
  Hofstede 
Argentina LA  1 
Australia ES  1 
Austria WE  1 
Belgium   1 
Bolivia LA  0 
Brazil LA  1 
Canada ES  1 
Chile LA  1 
China FE  0 
Colombia   1 
Cyprus ME  0 
Czech Republic  EE  0 
Denmark WE  1 
Ecuador   1 
Estonia EE  0 
Ethiopia AF  0 
Finland WE  1 
France WE  1 
Georgia EE  0 
Germany WE  1 
Ghana 
Greece 
AF 
WE 
 0 
1 
Country Schwartz Hofstede 
Hong Kong  FE  1 
Hungary EE  0 
India FE  1 
Indonesia FE  1 
Iran   1 
Ireland ES  1 
Israel ES  1 
Italy WE  1 
Japan FE  1 
Macedonia EE  0 
Malaysia FE  1 
Mexico LA  1 
Namibia AF  0 
Nepal FE  0 
Netherlands WE  1 
New Zealand  ES  1 
Norway WE  1 
Pakistan   1  
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Peru   1 
Philippines FE  1 
Poland EE  0 
Portugal WE  1 
Country Schwartz
  Hofstede 
Russia EE  0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
FE 
EE 
EE 
WE 
WE 
1 
Switzerland WE  1 
Taiwan FE  1 
Country Schwartz Hofstede 
Thailand   1 
Turkey ME  1 
Uganda AF  0 
United Kingdom ES  1 
United States  ES  1 
Uruguay   1 
Venezuela LA  1 
Yugoslavia     1 
Zimbabwe AF  0 
 
AF, EE, ES, FE, LA, ME, WE – In Schwartz’s sample, respectively: African, Eastern 
Europe, English-speaking, Far East, Latin America, Mediterranean, Western Europe. 
1, 0 – In Hofstede’s sample, respectively: included or not included.  
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Appendix 3. Mean Scores on Cultural Value Dimensions in Cultural Regions 
  Cultural Value Dimensions 
Region and  
# Countries 
Harmony Embedded- 
ness 
Hierarchy Mastery Affective 
Autonomy 
Intellectual 
Autonomy 
Egalitar- 
ianism 
Africa  (5)  3.75 4.17 2.71 4.20 3.04 4.20 4.52 
Eastern  Europe  (12)  4.49 4.00 2.31 3.85 3.01 4.29 4.63 
English-speaking  (7)  3.91 3.66 2.26 4.01 3.64 4.38 4.94 
Far  East  (10)  4.05 4.02 2.85 4.07 3.09 4.09 4.49 
Latin  America  (6) 4.25 3.85 2.24 4.00 3.00 4.40 4.91 
Western  Europe  (14)  4.57 3.34 1.90 3.93 3.74 4.86 5.13 
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FIGURE LEGENDS AND FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Structure of Cultural Value Dimensions according to Schwartz 
Figure 2. Interactions between Governance and Other Factors  
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